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I. Introduction 
Most litigation over the constitutionality of abortion 
regulation has argued through the lens of “effect,” asking 
whether the regulation imposes, in the words of Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,1 an “undue 
burden on a woman’s ability to make th[e] decision to procure an 
abortion.”2 This emphasis on the effect of abortion regulations 
overlooks the other prong of the undue burden test, a test which 
prohibits regulations on abortion that have either the “purpose or 
effect” of imposing an undue burden.3 A proper understanding of 
the purpose inquiry applicable to abortion regulations is integral 
to the unique form of intermediate scrutiny the Casey plurality 
substituted for strict scrutiny review and the trimester 
framework set out in Roe v. Wade.4 Unfortunately, though, the 
Court was far from clear about the role the purpose inquiry in 
Casey was designed to serve, perhaps due to the evolving nature 
of liberty jurisprudence generally and instability in the tiers of 
review in particular.5 
                                                                                                     
 1. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 2. Id. at 877 (plurality opinion) (“A finding of an undue burden is a 
shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or effect of 
placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a 
nonviable fetus.”). 
 3. See id. at 877–87 (emphasis added) (discussing the “purpose or effect” 
prong of the undue burden test). 
 4. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 5. For commentary about the disarray in tiers jurisprudence, see 
generally Lawrence G. Sager, Of Tiers of Scrutiny and Time Travel: A Reply to 
Dean Sullivan, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 819 (2002) (discussing disconnect between the 
Court’s insistence that it is applying “intermediate scrutiny” to gender-based 
classifications and the Court’s actions); William D. Araiza, After the Tiers: 
Windsor, Congressional Power to Enforce Equal Protection, and the Challenge of 
Pointillist Constitutionalism (Brooklyn Law Sch. Research Papers, Research 
Paper No. 354, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2310586. For a 
discussion of this as a continuing trend, see Josh Blackman, Preview of New 
Article—Kennedy’s Constitutional Chimera, JOSH BLACKMAN’S BLOG (Aug. 22, 
2013), http://joshblackman.com/blog/2013/08/22/preivew-of-new-article-kennedys-
constitutional-chimera/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2013) (arguing that the Court’s 
most recent jurisprudence “disregards long-standing norms of ‘suspect classes,’ 
‘fundamental rights[,]’” and “[i]nstead of speaking in terms of rights and 
classifications, the Court speaks more broadly in terms of liberty” and “puts 
aside” the “traditional scrutiny land approach”) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review).  
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A close reading of the Court’s use of purpose in Casey and 
subsequent abortion jurisprudence reveals that the purpose 
prong is serving two distinct functions. The first function of the 
purpose inquiry is to serve as a proxy for a determination of 
whether legislation in fact serves a legitimate state interest, one 
of sufficient importance to warrant the burden on rights it 
creates.6 Courts examine the evidence to determine whether the 
legislation serves the group of interests that the Supreme Court 
identified in Roe and Casey are valid reasons for the regulation of 
abortion. This part of the purpose test, which ensures that 
abortion legislation is not designed to “strike at the right itself,”7 
is emphasized explicitly in numerous places in the decision. The 
second function of the purpose prong is to serve the “smoking out” 
function ascribed by many scholars to any “heightened” scrutiny 
analysis,8 which determines whether the legislation is serving a 
hidden illegitimate purpose. As discussed below, this second 
function of the purpose prong was also in play in Casey.9 
Because of the lack of clarity in Casey about these two 
distinct functions, both served in the name of “purpose,” and also 
because the role of the second function of purpose in equality 
jurisprudence has been the subject of much scholarly debate, the 
courts have conflated the two functions in their purpose analyses 
after Casey. The resulting doctrine is a mess, creating rampant 
confusion and decisions at odds on theoretical and practical 
levels. In particular, there is disagreement between the Circuits 
                                                                                                     
 6. See Stephen A. Siegel, The Origin of the Compelling State Interest Test 
and Strict Scrutiny, 48 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 355, 401–07 (2006) (discussing 
purpose in the sense of serving a state interest, a “legitimate purpose,” under 
different levels of review). Siegel notes that even rationality review includes 
such an analysis though a very permissive one because the legitimate ends of 
government are considered to be “so boundless.” Id. at 358 n.24. Siegel also 
notes that even rationality review may result in overturning sufficiently 
egregious government action that runs afoul of the Constitution’s “valid 
purpose” requirement. Id. (discussing Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 
(1960)). 
 7. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992). 
 8. See, e.g., Caitlin E. Borgmann, In Abortion Litigation, It’s the Facts that 
Matter, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 149, 150–51 (2014), available at http://www. 
harvardlawreview.org/issues/127/february14/forum_1026.php (focusing on the 
“smoking out” function of the purpose prong and arguing that it is possible to 
smoke out illegitimate purposes indirectly). 
 9. Infra text accompanying notes 41–51.  
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over the appropriate level of scrutiny of claimed state interests 
and whether this scrutiny is part of the purpose analysis.10 The 
Fifth Circuit’s own analysis of purpose has shifted along with the 
Circuit’s ideological makeup.11 As I show in what follows, some 
courts have merged their first function and second function 
purpose inquiries, further muddying the works.  
After some early rigorous purpose analyses in the Fifth 
Circuit and Tenth Circuits in particular,12 and after a confused 
decision by the Supreme Court,13 purpose inquiry took a back 
seat. Now, however, states are pressing harder to find ways to 
restrict abortions in ways that will limit access, and lower courts 
struggle to articulate a line between regulations that have the 
effect of imposing “undue” burdens on the right to abortion, and 
are therefore unconstitutional, and regulations that place 
“tolerable” burdens on the right to abortion, and are therefore 
constitutional.14 Courts have returned to Casey’s purpose prong 
                                                                                                     
 10. For a discussion of different analyses courts have applied in the name 
of “purpose,” see generally Lucy E. Hill, Seeking Liberty’s Refuge: Analyzing 
Legislative Purpose Under Casey’s Undue Burden Standard, 81 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 365 (2012) (describing different purpose tests used by different circuits 
prior to 2012). See also Borgmann, supra note 8, at 150–51 (arguing that 
purpose review has been “toothless”). 
 11. Compare Okpalobi v. Foster, 190 F.3d 337, 356–57 (5th Cir. 1999) 
(determining the state’s claimed purpose—“to inform a woman of all the risks 
associated with having an abortion”—was “not credible” by closely examining a 
previous statute mandating informed consent and finding that the new statute 
“ensure[d] that a physician cannot insulate himself from liability by” giving 
appropriate informed consent), vacated and rev’d on other grounds en banc, 244 
F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2001), with Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical 
Health Servs. v. Abbott, 734 F.3d 406, 411 (5th Cir. 2013) (determining that the 
admitting privilege requirement served claimed purpose of promoting women’s 
health and that “‘a legislative choice is not subject to courtroom factfinding and 
may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical 
data’” (citation omitted)). See also infra text accompanying notes 79, 93–100. 
 12. See Hill, supra note 10, at 392–96 (analyzing the Tenth and Fifth 
Circuits views on “purpose”).  
 13. See Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972–74 (1997) (finding no 
evidence of legislature’s hidden illegitimate “purpose” in banning abortions by 
trained Physician Assistant; and also accepting that the legislation served 
legitimate purpose, citing approval of physician-only requirements in Supreme 
Court dicta, but failing to clarify that these were separate inquiries); see also 
infra text accompanying notes 50–61. 
 14. See infra Part II (discussing constitutional and unconstitutional 
restrictions on abortions). The evolution of the effects test itself will make for an 
interesting study that is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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as a means to impose limits on regulations that are true to the 
balance that the plurality decision in Casey professed to create 
between the rights of women and the authority of the state to 
regulate abortions.15 
Two competing conceptions of purpose are locking horns in 
cases reviewing requirements that doctors obtain admitting 
privileges from a hospital within a certain distance of the facility 
at which they provide abortions. Decisions from the Seventh 
Circuit and the Fifth Circuit, one issued on a motion for 
preliminary injunction, and so at an early stage in the litigation, 
and the other rushed through to conclusion and issued as this 
paper goes to press, are on a collision course that will end only in 
the Supreme Court.16 The Seventh Circuit decision requires a 
hands-on review of the evidence to determine whether the state 
proved that the legislation in fact served the claimed state 
interest, while the Fifth Circuit applies a form of review below 
rational basis review, what we might call oxymoronically 
“rational speculation” review.17 This Article (1) identifies the two 
functions served by Casey’s purpose prong and the role both 
functions serve in preserving Casey’s unique form of intermediate 
scrutiny, (2) argues that these two functions are analytically 
distinct and demand two separate inquiries, and (3) shows that 
                                                                                                     
 15. See infra Part III (discussing the use of Casey’s purpose prong).  
 16. Compare Abbott, 734 F.3d at 411 (advocating a hands-off approach to 
argue that the claimed purpose of a statute is “a legislative choice . . . not 
subject to courtroom factfinding” but may be based on “rational speculation 
unsupported by evidence or empirical data” (citation omitted)), with Planned 
Parenthood of Wis. v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 786, 795 (7th Cir. 2013) (finding an 
invalid purpose where a state “neither presented evidence of a health benefit 
(beyond an inconclusive affidavit by one doctor concerning one abortion patient 
in another state[ . . . ]), [n]or rebutted the plaintiffs’ evidence that the statute if 
upheld will harm abortion providers and their clients and potential clients”). See 
infra Part IV (discussing cases). As this Article went to press, the Fifth Circuit 
issued its decision in Planned Parenthood of Greater Texas Surgical Health 
Services. v. Abbott, No. 13-51008 (5th Cir. May 27, 2014), restating the position 
it took in the opinion on preliminary injunction that the lowest level of rational 
basis review applies to abortion legislation, according to which courts must only 
determine whether any conceivable rationale exists for an enactment. Abbott, 
slip op. at 14–15. The court seemed to go even further, arguably characterizing 
the undue burden test as a lower standard of review than rational basis review 
by stating that abortion legislation must not impose an undue burden and “must 
also pass rational basis review.” Id. at 7. 
 17. Supra note 16 and accompanying text.  
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Casey’s version of intermediate scrutiny requires courts to 
undertake a first function review of purpose by determining 
whether abortion legislation in fact serves a legitimate state 
interest. 
II. Casey’s Balance: Intermediate Scrutiny 
At the time Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey was argued in the spring of 1992, abortion 
rights supporters feared Roe would be overturned outright. Only 
the votes of Justices Stevens and Blackmun were firmly in hand, 
while Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Scalia, and 
Thomas were firmly opposed to Roe.18 All the anti-choice camp 
had to do to reverse Roe was obtain the vote of only one of the 
new Republican appointees, Justices Kennedy, O’Connor, or 
Souter. Justice Kennedy and even Justice Souter had voted with 
the majority in Rust v. Sullivan19 to uphold a regulation that 
prohibited employees of family planning clinics receiving federal 
money from counseling their patients on abortion.20 Justice 
O’Connor, while voting in Rust to strike down the restrictive 
regulations on nonconstitutional grounds, had proven hostile to 
                                                                                                     
 18. Justices Rehnquist, White, and Scalia were all on record as opposed to 
Roe. See, e.g., Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 532 (1989) 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that Roe should be overturned more explicitly); 
Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 795 
(1986) (White, J., dissenting) (“[T]he State’s interest, if compelling after 
viability, is equally compelling before viability.”); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 173 
(1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that courts should apply rational 
basis review to abortion regulations and that the Court’s “invalidation of any 
restrictions on abortion during the first trimester is impossible to justify under 
that standard”); id. at 221 (White, J., dissenting) (stating that the issue of 
abortion regulation should not be decided by the Court and instead should be 
left to the legislature). While Justice Thomas had no written record on Roe, his 
claim at his confirmation hearing in 1991 that he had never expressed a view on 
Roe v. Wade, even in private, was viewed as not credible, and he was considered 
a no vote. See Michael J. Gerhardt, Divided Justice: A Commentary on the 
Nomination and Confirmation of Justice Thomas, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 969, 
981 (1992) (“It stretched credulity for Justice Thomas to claim that he never 
seriously discussed Roe v. Wade . . . even though Roe was one of the most 
important constitutional law cases . . . and he had criticized it more than once in 
his public statements and writings.” (citations omitted)). 
 19. 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
 20. Id. at 203. 
CASEY’S PURPOSE INQUIRY 1141 
the Roe standard in Thornburgh v. ACOG,21 City of Akron v. 
Akron Center for Reproductive Health,22 and Webster v. 
Reproductive Health Services.23 
In a surprise twist and after much internal debate among 
Justices O’Connor, Souter, and Stevens,24 the three Justices 
joined together to forge a middle ground in between the four 
firmly anti-Roe Justices and the two firmly pro-Roe Justices. In a 
plurality decision that they hoped would placate both sides of the 
abortion debate, Justices O’Connor, Souter, and Kennedy 
acknowledged the divisiveness of the issue that was very much on 
their minds:  
Whether or not a new social consensus is developing on that 
issue, its divisiveness is no less today than in 1973, and 
pressure to overrule the decision, like pressure to retain it, has 
grown only more intense. A decision to overrule Roe’s essential 
holding under the existing circumstances would address error, 
if error there was, at the cost of both profound and 
unnecessary damage to the Court’s legitimacy, and to the 
Nation’s commitment to the rule of law. It is therefore 
imperative to adhere to the essence of Roe’s original decision, 
and we do so today.25 
                                                                                                     
 21. See Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 828 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“The State 
has compelling interests in ensuring maternal health and in protecting potential 
human life, and these interests exist ‘throughout pregnancy.’” (citation 
omitted)). 
 22. See City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 452–
61 (1983) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with Roe’s trimester approach). 
In referring to the Roe framework in her dissent in Akron, in which Rehnquist 
and White joined, Justice O’Connor wrote that 
it is apparently for the Court’s opinion that neither sound 
constitutional theory nor our need to decide cases based on the 
application of neutral principles can accommodate an analytical 
framework that varies according to the ‘stages’ of pregnancy, where 
those stages, and their concomitant standards of review, differ 
according to the level of medical technology available when a 
particular challenge to state regulation occurs.  
Id. at 452–53. 
 23. See Webster, 492 U.S. at 527 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (discussing 
potentially reexamining the Roe decision). 
 24. See LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN: HARRY 
BLACKMUN’S SUPREME COURT JOURNEY 200–06 (1st ed. 2005) (describing the 
Court’s decision making processes in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey). 
 25. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 869 (1992). 
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With mixed emotions, the Justices announced they were 
reaffirming Roe’s protection of a woman’s right to obtain 
previability abortions, as well as Roe’s rule that states could go so 
far as to ban abortions postviability as long as a woman’s life and 
health were protected.26 Pro-choice activists, relieved that Roe 
had not been overturned, were initially pleased with the result 
and especially took to heart the Court’s discussion of the 
importance of the equality interests at stake in the case, as well 
as its acknowledgement that people of conscience stood on both 
sides of the issue.27 Anti-choice advocates who had thought 
victory was close at hand and had reason to expect the Court to 
overrule Roe were sorely disappointed, experiencing Casey as a 
significant loss.28 
However, the Justices gave a great deal to the anti-choice 
side. Emphasizing that Roe “speaks with clarity in establishing 
not only the woman’s liberty but also the State’s ‘important and 
legitimate interest in potential life,’”29 the Court firmly declared 
that “[t]hat portion of the decision in Roe has been given too little 
acknowledgment and implementation by the Court in its 
subsequent cases.”30 To expand opportunities for state 
regulation,31 the Court abandoned strict scrutiny review and the 
                                                                                                     
 26. See id. at 869–74 (discussing the holding and stating that “[a] decision 
to overrule Roe’s essential holding [would lead to] profound and unnecessary 
damage to the Court’s legitimacy, and to the Nation’s commitment to the rule of 
law,” and that it was therefore “imperative to adhere to the essence of Roe’s 
original decision”). 
 27. See id. at 856 (“The ability of women to participate equally in the 
economic and social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to 
control their reproductive lives.” (citing ROSALIND POLLACK PETCHESKY, 
ABORTION AND WOMAN’S CHOICE: THE STATE, SEXUALITY, AND REPRODUCTIVE 
FREEDOM 109, 133 n.7 (1990))); id. at 852 (recognizing that the abortion decision 
“originate[s] within the zone of conscience and belief”); id. at 850 (recognizing 
that “men and women of good conscience can disagree”).  
 28. See Neal Devins, How Planned Parenthood v. Casey (Pretty Much) 
Settled the Abortion Wars, 118 YALE L.J. 1318, 1329 (2009) (“National Right to 
Life Committee state legislative director Burke Balch lamented, ‘We’ve been 
fighting to overturn Roe v. Wade for 20 years and if necessary we’ll fight for 20 
more, but for now, we’ve lost.’” (quoting Tamar Lewin, Long Battles Over 
Abortion Are Seen, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1992, at A18)). 
 29. Casey, 505 U.S. at 871 (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973)). 
 30. Id. 
 31. The Court directly overruled those portions of Akron and Thornburgh 
that struck down laws imposing a mandatory delay and requiring provision of 
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“rigid trimester framework” resulting from implementation of 
strict scrutiny in Roe, reasoning that “[a] framework of this 
rigidity was unnecessary and in its later interpretation 
sometimes contradicted the State’s permissible exercise of its 
powers.”32 From now on, the undue burden standard would 
govern review of previability abortion regulation: 
To protect the central right recognized by Roe v. Wade while at 
the same time accommodating the State’s profound interest in 
potential life, we will employ the undue burden analysis as 
explained in this opinion. An undue burden exists, and 
therefore a provision of law is invalid, if its purpose or effect is 
to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking 
an abortion before the fetus attains viability.33 
Importantly, though, in adopting what has become known as 
Casey’s “undue burden test,” the plurality adopted a middle 
position, a type of intermediate scrutiny. While turning its back 
on strict scrutiny and the trimester framework it had required, 
the Court also refused to adopt the rational relationship test 
advocated by Chief Justice Rehnquist in dissent.34 Instead, the 
Court maintained the requirement that legislation concerning 
abortion serve the previously approved state interests in 
potential life and maternal health, and now allowed such 
regulations to apply throughout pregnancy, with the important 
limitations discussed next.  
                                                                                                     
state-mandated information before a woman could have an abortion, declaring:  
[W]e depart from the holdings of Akron I and Thornburgh to the 
extent that we permit a State to further its legitimate goal of 
protecting the life of the unborn by enacting legislation aimed at 
ensuring a decision that is mature and informed, even when in so 
doing the State expresses a preference for childbirth over abortion. 
Id.at 883. 
 32. Id. at 872. 
 33. Id. at 878 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added). 
 34. See id. at 845 (distinguishing this analysis from that in the dissent of 
Chief Justice Rehnquist who “admits that he would overrule the central holding 
of Roe and adopt the rational relationship test as the sole criterion of 
constitutionality”); cf. id. at 966 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (arguing that “[a] woman’s interest in having an abortion is a 
form of liberty protected by the Due Process Clause, but States may regulate 
abortion procedures in ways rationally related to a legitimate state interest”). 
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A. Purpose’s First Function: Does the Legislation in Fact Serve a 
State Interest? 
In Casey, the Court emphasized its inquiry into the purpose 
of abortion regulations in its discussion of the provisions it 
upheld—the mandatory delay, information, recordkeeping, and 
reporting requirements. First, the purpose must not be “designed 
to strike at the right itself.”35 Instead, the Court wrote:  
To promote the State’s profound interest in potential life, 
throughout pregnancy the State may take measures to ensure 
that the woman’s choice is informed, and measures designed to 
advance this interest will not be invalidated as long as their 
purpose is to persuade the woman to choose childbirth over 
abortion.36  
Not all regulations that could promote this interest in, or 
“purpose of,” dissuading women from choosing abortion, however, 
are valid. The Court emphasized that these measures must 
inform the woman’s choice, not hinder it.37  
 Second, the Court confirmed the state’s ability to legislate to 
serve its valid interest in the pregnant woman’s health, noting 
that “[a]s with any medical procedure, the State may enact 
regulations to further the health or safety of a woman seeking an 
abortion.”38 Regulations that do not further the health or safety of 
the woman seeking an abortion were suspect: “[u]nnecessary 
health regulations that have the purpose or effect of presenting a 
substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion impose an 
undue burden on the right.”39 With respect to the recordkeeping 
and reporting requirements, the Court found that not only do 
these requirements “relate to health,” but also examined the 
legislation’s fit, finding that: 
[t]he collection of information with respect to actual patients is 
a vital element of medical research, and so it cannot be said 
                                                                                                     
 35. Id. at 874. 
 36. Id. at 878 (emphasis added). 
 37. Id. at 877. 
 38. Id. (emphasis added). 
 39. Id. (emphasis added). 
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that the requirements serve no purpose other than to make 
abortions more difficult.40 
With respect to both the mandatory information requirements 
and the recordkeeping requirements, then, the Court examined 
the factual record to determine whether in fact the requirements 
served the claimed state interest. 
B. Purpose’s Second Function: Smoking Out Hidden Purposes for 
Abortion Regulation 
The Court’s purpose analysis also came into play in review of 
the spousal notification provision, but this time the Court enacted 
the second function of the purpose prong, that of rooting out 
hidden purposes. Although the Court could have stopped its 
analysis of the spousal notice provision after determining that it 
had the effect of imposing a substantial obstacle, it went on to 
discuss the law’s invalid purpose as well. The Court found it 
particularly objectionable that the spousal notice provision 
empower[s] [the husband] with this troubling degree of 
authority over his wife. . . . reminiscent of the common law. . . . 
A State may not give to a man the kind of dominion over his 
wife that parents exercise over their children. 
[The spousal notice requirement] embodies a view of 
marriage consonant with the common-law status of married 
women but repugnant to our present understanding of 
marriage and of the nature of the rights secured by the 
Constitution.41 
Thus, even though the state has a valid interest in 
dissuading a woman from choosing abortion,42 and the regulation 
arguably would have served that interest under a “rational 
speculation” test, like that applied by the Fifth Circuit in 
Abbott,43 the Court went out of its way to lodge its objection to the 
state’s reliance on, and promotion of, outmoded stereotypes in 
attempting to dissuade the woman. In revealing this hidden 
                                                                                                     
 40. Id. at 900–01 (emphasis added). 
 41. Id. at 898. 
 42. See id.at 873–74 (discussing the state’s valid interest). 
 43. Supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
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illegitimate purpose of the regulation, the Court made plain it 
would not countenance legislation serving such purposes. The 
Court thus referenced the role heightened scrutiny has played in 
jurisprudence involving equality guarantees.44 It protects the 
regulated group, in this case women, not only from the impact of 
a law in restricting rights but also from the “disadvantage, . . . 
separate status, and . . . stigma”45 that results from 
discriminatory treatment that reinforces status hierarchies.46  
The right to abortion has become properly understood not 
just as a species of liberty but also as having an equality 
component, as Justice Ginsburg recognized in dissent in Gonzales 
v. Carhart47 and as scholars have argued for years.48 This 
                                                                                                     
 44. Many scholars have made extensive study of the role of heightened 
scrutiny, and particularly the role of inquiry into purpose in protecting 
constitutional rights. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A 
THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 145–48 (1980) (discussing the role of legislative 
intent in review of segregation and desegregation efforts); Paul Brest, Palmer v. 
Thompson, An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 
1971 SUP. CT. REV. 95, 98–99 (introducing the conflict in Palmer v. Thompson 
about whether legislative intent should be considered in determining an equal 
protection violation); Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 
84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1700 (1984) (discussing the role of heightened review in 
the prohibition of naked preference). John Hart Ely argued that all different 
levels of constitutional scrutiny could be used to guard against illegitimate 
discriminatory purposes to “smoke them out.” ELY, supra, at 145–48; see also, 
e.g., Kim Forde-Mazrui, The Constitutional Implications of Race-Neutral 
Affirmative Action, 88 GEO. L.J. 2331, 2359–64 (2000) (discussing the functions 
of strict scrutiny review: “smoking out” illegitimate purposes and balancing 
costs and benefits).  
 45. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013). 
 46. Indeed, inquiry into purpose has served a historic role in this country’s 
evolving treatment of traditionally oppressed groups, see Sunstein, supra note 
44, at 1700 (discussing review of statutes under heightened scrutiny review), a 
role required because equality mandates are often adopted as aspirations before 
what “equality” means for a previously oppressed group is truly understood. See 
J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313, 2315 (1997) (noting 
that “[l]arge-scale changes in social structure require social transformation over 
long periods of time”). 
 47. 550 U.S. 124, 172 (2007). 
 48. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Sex Equality Arguments for Reproductive 
Rights: Their Critical Basis and Evolving Constitutional Expression, 56 EMORY 
L.J. 815, 819–22 (2007) (discussing the connection between equality rights and 
the right to abortion; citing other scholars making similar equality arguments); 
Reva B. Siegel, The New Politics of Abortion: An Equality Analysis of Woman-
Protective Abortion Restrictions, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 991, 994–99 (discussing the 
interaction between equal protection and South Dakota’s recent laws regulating 
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merging of equality and liberty rights protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment has been identified by the Court as part 
of an equal right to liberty.49 It is understandable, therefore, that 
the courts reviewing abortion restrictions have become more 
attentive to notions of illicit purpose.50 The prohibition of 
illegitimate purposes in the abortion context, the reliance on 
outmoded stereotypes, and the view that women’s only true 
fulfillment comes through motherhood, like the prohibition of 
“naked preferences,”51 must be rooted out if we are to ensure 
equality to women. 
This second function of the purpose inquiry, while important, 
has served to muddy the vital role of the first function of the 
purpose inquiry in maintaining Casey’s test. Courts must conduct 
their evaluations to reveal hidden purposes without obscuring the 
first function, that is, ensuring that the legislation in fact serves 
a legitimate interest.  
                                                                                                     
and limiting abortion); Priscilla Smith, Give Justice Ginsburg What She Wants: 
Using Sex Equality Arguments to Demand Examination of the Legitimacy of 
State Interests in Abortion Regulation, 34 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 377, 383–88 
(2011) [hereinafter Smith, Give Justice Ginsburg] (explaining arguments in 
support and citing other scholars making equality arguments). 
 49. See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 172 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[L]egal 
challenges to undue restrictions on abortion procedures do not seek to vindicate 
some generalized notion of privacy; rather, they center on a woman’s autonomy 
to determine her life’s course, and thus to enjoy equal citizenship statute.” 
(citing Reva B. Siegel, Reasoning From the Body: A Historical Perspective on 
Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261 
(1992); Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 
955, 1002–28 (1984))); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013) 
(“The liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause contains 
within it the prohibition against denying to any person the equal protection of 
the laws.”); see also, e.g., Kim Shayo Buchanan, Lawrence v. Geduldig: 
Regulating Women’s Sexuality, 56 EMORY L.J. 1235, 1294 (2007) (discussing 
rights to equal sexual liberty); Smith, Give Justice Ginsburg, supra note 48, at 
407–12 (arguing that courts will be more receptive to equality arguments in an 
equal right to liberty frame rather than an equal protection frame). 
 50. Judicial inquiry into motivation of state action plays an especially 
important role in preservation of constitutional rights—especially those 
involving equality concerns, as Paul Brest articulated more than forty years ago 
in his article discussing Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971). See Brest, 
supra note 44, at 139–46 (arguing in favor of judicial review of legislative 
motivation). 
 51. See Sunstein, supra note 44, at 1700 (explaining that a “naked 
preference” triggers a heightened scrutiny review). 
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III. Post-Casey Purpose Inquiries in the Abortion Cases  
The Supreme Court has weighed in on purpose analysis two 
times after Casey, confirming Casey’s adoption of an intermediate 
scrutiny analysis requiring scrutiny of the state interest claimed 
and a fit analysis in the name of “purpose.”52 In Mazurek v. 
Armstrong,53 the Supreme Court reversed a Ninth Circuit ruling 
that relied on a purpose theory to strike down a law preventing 
physician assistants from performing abortions, even under a 
doctor’s supervision.54 In Mazurek, while rejecting a purpose 
claim based on what it saw as insufficient evidence of improper 
“purpose,” the Court did not reject the purpose line of argument, 
nor the two separate functions that purpose was meant to serve.55 
The problem with the Court’s decision is that it conflated the 
two functions of purpose. The Court conducted the first function 
analysis, conducting an inquiry into proper tailoring to serve a 
valid purpose, finding that the requirement that only physicians 
perform abortions in fact served a valid interest in women’s 
health by reference to a statement in Casey.56 Given that the 
Court had indicated its approval of licensing restrictions as a 
means to protect women’s health in the past,57 it is hardly 
surprising that the Court approved of “purpose” in the first 
function sense—that it in fact served a valid state interest in the 
health of the woman seeking abortion.  
                                                                                                     
 52. Cf. Borgmann, supra note 8, at 150 (arguing that “[i]n addition to 
making it virtually impossible for challengers to prove an illegitimate purpose to 
the Court's satisfaction, the Court has made it very easy for the state to 
demonstrate a valid purpose for the law,” but noting that courts should evaluate 
factual record more closely under Casey).  
 53. 520 U.S. 968 (1997). 
 54. See id.at 969–71, 976 (describing the law at issue, reversing the Ninth 
Circuit’s judgment and remanding for further proceedings). 
 55. See id. at 974 (premising its reversal of the Ninth Circuit on a lack of 
legislative intent and the “insufficient evidence that the law created a 
‘substantial obstacle’ to abortion” rather than on any substantive disagreement 
with the purpose prong of Casey). 
 56. See id. (noting that “[o]ur cases reflect the fact that the Constitution 
gives the States broad latitude to decide that particular functions may be 
performed only by licensed professionals, even if an objective assessment might 
suggest that those same tasks could be performed by others” (citing Planned 
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 885 (1992))). 
 57. Id. 
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The negative language about failure to establish illicit 
“purpose” in Mazurek concerns the second function of the purpose 
inquiry, that is the inquiry into whether some hidden motive 
infected the legislative process. As a Fifth Circuit panel in 
Okpalobi v. Foster58 pointed out, the Supreme Court simply found 
that evidence of improper purpose “discounted by the Court on 
other occasions—medical data indicating that non-physicians are 
capable of performing abortions safely and the involvement of 
certain lobbying groups in the legislative process”—was 
insufficient to establish illicit purpose.59 Still, dicta in the Court’s 
decision raised questions about the power of the purpose prong in 
cases where litigants could not also prove the legislation had the 
effect of imposing an undue burden.60 These dicta may have 
discouraged litigants from pressing these claims, especially in the 
hostile context of “partial-birth abortion” regulation, challenges to 
which dominated the litigation landscape for the next ten years 
post-Mazurek.61  
The next time the Court weighed in on Casey’s purpose prong 
was in Gonzales v. Carhart,62 where the Court conducted a 
detailed “purpose” inquiry in the first function sense, despite the 
fact that plaintiffs had not pressed the claim in that case.63 While 
                                                                                                     
 58. 190 F.3d 337 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 59. Id. at 355.  
 60. Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 974–75 (1997) (noting that 
because the Montana law did not have the effect of creating a substantial 
obstacle to a woman’s right to seek an abortion before the fetus attains viability, 
“there is simply no evidence that the legislature intended the law to do what it 
plainly did not do”). 
 61. See Stuart Buck & Mark L. Rienzi, Federal Courts, Overbreadth, and 
Vagueness: Guiding Principles for Constitutional Challenges to Uninterpreted 
State Statutes, 2002 UTAH L. REV. 381, 406 (“In a way never before seen in our 
federal courts, legislative efforts to restrict partial-birth abortion gave rise to a 
flood of litigation challenging partial-birth abortion statutes . . . .”). 
 62. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 156–60 (2007) (conducting an 
extensive inquiry into the governmental objectives that justify the statute and 
the legislative intent underpinning those objectives). 
 63. See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 
U.S. 124 (2007) (No. 05-380) (containing no extended discussion of the 
legislative intent or the governmental objectives behind the partial-birth 
abortion statute in question); see also Priscilla J. Smith, Is the Glass Half-Full?: 
Gonzales v. Carhart and the Future of Abortion Jurisprudence, 2 HARV. L. & 
POL’Y REV. ONLINE (Apr. 9, 2008) (manuscript at 11) [hereinafter Smith, Is the 
Glass Half-Full?], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1357506 (“The plaintiffs 
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upholding a ban on a method of second-trimester surgical 
abortions, narrowly defined by the Court to leave the vast 
majority of second-trimester procedures untouched,64 the Court 
was careful to examine the validity of state interests as well as to 
conduct a fit analysis under the guise of the “purpose prong,” 
asking whether those interests were in fact served by the 
legislation.65 
Some have seen the purpose inquiry in Gonzales as 
undermining claims of purpose66 because the Court upheld a ban 
on a method of performing abortions by reference to the state’s 
dual interests in protecting potential life through dissuasion and 
in maintaining the “integrity and ethics of the medical 
profession.”67 However, there is no question that the Court 
conducted a fit analysis to determine whether the statute in fact 
served a valid state interest, finding that “a necessary effect of 
the regulation and the knowledge it conveys will be to encourage 
some women to carry the infant to full term, thus reducing the 
absolute number of late-term abortions.”68 According to the Court, 
the public debate about the type of abortions being banned would 
discourage at least some women from obtaining abortions without 
hindering them because other methods were always available.69 
                                                                                                     
did not make a claim that the law imposed an undue burden because it had the 
purpose of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman obtaining an 
abortion.” (emphasis added)). 
 64. See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 150–52, 168 (finding that the act does not 
impose “an undue burden on a woman’s right to abortion” because the Court 
limited its application to a prohibition on intact dilation and evacuation, a less 
common procedure). 
 65. See id. at 156–60 (finding that Congress intended for the act to respect 
the “dignity of human life” and protect the “integrity and ethics of the medical 
profession,” not to “place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking 
an abortion” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 66. Borgmann, supra note 8, at 150 (arguing that the Supreme Court 
“applied a weak version of Casey’s ‘purpose prong’ when it upheld the federal 
Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act, requiring only that Congress have had a 
‘rational basis to act’”). 
 67. See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 156, 159–60 (noting that “[t]he State has an 
interest in ensuring [that the partial-birth abortion] choice is well informed”).  
 68. Id. at 160. 
 69. See id. (discussing another method of dilation and evacuation that 
escaped the partial-birth abortion ban and could be utilized). The Court 
expressed concern about “th[e] lack of information concerning the way in which 
the fetus will be killed” and its hope that “[t]he medical profession, furthermore, 
CASEY’S PURPOSE INQUIRY 1151 
While Justice Ginsburg argued in dissent that because the 
statute banned the abortions rather than requiring the doctors to 
provide information about them to patients and letting them 
decide, it did not serve the interest in dissuasion,70 the Court was 
clear that it disagreed and saw the ban as a valid method of 
dissuasion.71 Gonzales, therefore, supports the claim that an 
analysis of whether a regulation of abortion in fact serves a valid 
state interest is the first function of the purpose prong.  
The main support for the idea that abortion regulations 
should be subjected only to a rational basis review comes from 
two references in Gonzales to a “rational” regulation or “rational 
basis” for regulations that are taken out of context. Both 
references are carefully limited to the facts of the case, which 
involved barring one procedure and substituting others and 
where only “marginal safety” considerations separated the two.72 
Even in that context, the Court is careful to note that the 
regulations must in fact serve a legitimate state interest. As the 
Court wrote: “Considerations of marginal safety, including the 
balance of risks, are within the legislative competence when the 
regulation is rational and in pursuit of legitimate ends.”73 
                                                                                                     
may find different and less shocking methods to abort the fetus in the second 
trimester, thereby accommodating legislative demand.” Id. at 159–60. Justice 
Kennedy, writing for the majority, noted that “[t]he State’s interest in respect 
for life is advanced by the dialogue that better informs the political and legal 
systems, the medical profession, expectant mothers, and society as a whole of 
the consequences that follow from a decision to elect a late-term abortion.” Id. at 
129. 
 70. See id. at 183–84 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The solution the Court 
approves, then, is not to require doctors to inform women, accurately and 
adequately, of the different procedures and their attendant risks. Instead, the 
Court deprives women of the right to make an autonomous choice, even at the 
expense of their safety.” (citations omitted)). 
 71. See id. at 160 (majority opinion) (arguing that the “lack of information 
concerning the way in which the fetus will be killed . . . is of legitimate concern 
to the State”); Smith, Is the Glass Half-Full?, supra note 63, at 13–14 (noting 
that there is “nothing in the opinion renouncing . . . the Court’s approval of 
statutes mandating that women receive certain information before they obtain 
an abortion” and that such information can be used to dissuade women from 
getting an abortion). 
 72. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 158, 166 (2007) (using the terms 
of art in a very limited manner). 
 73. Id. at 166 (emphasis added); see also id. (“When standard medical 
options are available, mere convenience does not suffice to displace them; and if 
some procedures have different risks than others, it does not follow that the 
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Similarly, the Court mentions “rational basis” when it indicates 
that it will not allow the health requirement in abortion 
jurisprudence to allow doctors to choose any method he or she 
might prefer, even where the safety benefits were as small as the 
Court saw them to be in that case. Again, though, the Court is 
careful to make clear that the regulations must be “in 
furtherance of . . . legitimate interests.”74 Thus, nothing in 
Gonzales suffices to overturn Casey’s requirement that courts 
conduct an analysis of whether a regulation serves a legitimate 
state interest. 
This means that if a regulation purports to regulate in the 
interest of potential life by informing a woman’s decision in an 
attempt either to dissuade her from obtaining the abortion or just 
in an effort to ensure her decision is well-informed,75 the courts 
must inquire whether the regulation actually serves that function 
or instead hinders the decision making process by requiring 
information that is irrelevant, false, misleading, or harmful.76 
Evidence that the regulation hinders and does not inform the 
process establishes a purpose of imposing an undue burden under 
Casey.77 If the regulation purports to regulate in the interest of 
the health of the woman seeking an abortion, evidence that it 
would not serve the woman’s health, including evidence that it 
would actually harm the woman’s health, undermines the claim 
of valid purpose and is evidence that the regulation is designed 
simply to “strike at the right itself.”78  
                                                                                                     
State is altogether barred from imposing reasonable regulations.”). 
 74. Id. at 158 (emphasis added). 
 75. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992) 
(“[T]he State may take measures to ensure that the woman’s choice is informed, 
and measures designed to advance this interest will not be invalidated as long 
as their purpose is to persuade the woman to choose childbirth over abortion.”). 
 76. See id. at 882, 968 (analyzing whether a statue requiring physicians to 
disclose information about child support and state funding for abortion 
alternatives requires practitioners to give “false or inaccurate” information and 
permitting an informed consent requirement where information provided is 
“truthful and not misleading”). 
 77. See supra Part II.B (exploring the various portions of the Casey opinion 
that described the purpose requirement and recounting which portions of the 
regulations examined did not have a legitimate purpose). 
 78. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013) (“DOMA’s 
principal effect is to identify a subset of state-sanctioned marriages and make 
them unequal. The principal purpose is to impose inequality, not for other 
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After Gonzales, courts now are beginning to turn back to 
some of the early post-Casey decisions that conducted a purpose 
analysis and to apply their methods. Some cases are simple. 
Where the result of the law is to ban previability abortions, either 
entirely or in a specific gestational range, even if the ban operates 
through incidental means, courts have had no problem holding 
that the purpose was improper.79 As one district court judge 
recently wrote, the plaintiffs demonstrated a likelihood of success 
on the merits of their claim that the statute had an 
unconstitutional purpose because “the purpose of the bill appears 
to be the preservation of unborn human life through the creation 
of substantial, likely insurmountable, obstacles in the path of 
women seeking abortions in Nebraska.”80 Regulations short of a 
ban have proven more difficult. The Court’s lack of clarity about 
the two functions of purpose is causing confusion and has given 
fodder to one Fifth Circuit panel that is intent on imposing a 
“rational speculation” analysis on abortion regulations, even 
lower than Justice Rehnquist’s rejected rational basis review.  
The starkest contrast is between the Seventh and Fifth 
Circuit cases mentioned at the beginning of this article. In 
Planned Parenthood v. Van Hollen,81 the Seventh Circuit 
affirmed the trial court’s grant of a preliminary injunction 
against enforcement of a provision requiring physicians providing 
abortions to obtain admitting privileges at a hospital within 
                                                                                                     
reasons like governmental efficiency.”). 
 79. See Okpalobi v. Foster, 190 F.3d 337, 354–57 (5th Cir. 1999) 
(conducting a purpose analysis and accepting plaintiffs’ argument that 
Louisiana’s civil liability provision enabling civil actions to be brought against 
the abortion provider for damages caused by an abortion, including “damage to 
the unborn child,” essentially created a ban on abortions), vacated and rev’d on 
other grounds en banc, 244 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2001); Jane L. v. Bangerter, 102 
F.3d 1112, 1116–17 (10th Cir. 1996) (striking down a statute banning abortions 
after twenty weeks with few exceptions as having the purpose of imposing an 
undue burden on abortion and noting that a law’s historical and social context 
showing a desire to ban abortion altogether is evidence of improper purpose to 
impose an undue burden); Planned Parenthood of the Heartland v. Heineman, 
724 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043–46 (D. Neb. 2010) (finding that a law imposing 
disclosure requirements on physicians that were so vague that compliance 
would prove impossible had the impermissible purpose of banning abortions). 
 80. Heineman, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 1046. 
 81. 738 F.3d 786 (7th Cir. 2013). 
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thirty miles of the clinic where they operated.82 Although “the 
purpose of the statute [was] not at issue in th[e] appeal,”83 the 
court went to great lengths to examine whether the regulation 
actually would serve the state’s claimed interest in promoting 
maternal health. As the court wrote: 
The state concedes that its only interest pertinent to this case 
is in the health of women who obtain abortions. But it has 
neither presented evidence of a health benefit (beyond an 
inconclusive affidavit by one doctor concerning one abortion 
patient in another state, . . . ) or rebutted the plaintiffs’ 
evidence that the statute if upheld will harm abortion 
providers and their clients and potential clients.84 
In Van Hollen, the two functions of purpose inform each 
other. The court’s suspicions about the state’s claimed interest 
were raised because the statute’s requirement was anomalous for 
reasons unrelated to any distinctions between abortion and other 
medical services. After noting that an “issue of equal protection of 
the laws is lurking in this case,” Judge Posner, writing for the 
court, adopted the trial court’s discussion of the purpose behind 
the statute:  
the complete absence of an admitting privileges requirement 
for . . . procedures including those with greater risk is 
certainly evidence that Wisconsin Legislature’s only purpose in 
its enactment was to restrict the availability of safe, legal 
abortion in this State, particularly given the lack of any 
demonstrable medical benefit for its requirement either 
presented to the Legislature or [to] this court.85 
                                                                                                     
 82. See id. at 787–88, 799 (reciting the details of the state law 
requirements and affirming the lower court’s injunction).  
 83. Id. at 791. Plaintiffs reserved the issue for trial, mainly arguing at this 
stage that the statute had the effect of imposing an undue burden on abortion. 
See id. at 804–06 (Mannion, J., concurring in part and in the judgment) 
(summarizing and evaluating the plaintiffs’ arguments regarding the effects 
prong). 
 84. Id. at 795 (majority opinion). 
 85. Id. at 790 (emphasis added). As further proof of improper purpose, the 
court pointed to the unreasonable “two-day deadline” imposed by the legislature 
that made compliance with the requirement impossible, as well as the “strange 
private civil remedy” provision entitling the father or grandparent to damages 
for a violation of the requirement upon proof of injury to the father or 
grandparent, but without proof of any harm to women’s health. Id. at 790–91. 
These two factors further undermined any claim that the legislature was 
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As another court wrote with disapproval, “[n]o such legislative 
concern for the health of women, or of men, has given rise to any 
remotely similar informed-consent statutes” applicable to any 
health services other than abortion.86  
Notably, this analysis is similar to the Supreme Court’s 
analysis of purpose in United States v. Windsor,87 where the 
Supreme Court struck down the Defense of Marriage Act as a 
violation of the plaintiff’s equal right to liberty.88 In Windsor, the 
Court noted that when attempting to determine “whether a law is 
motivated by an improper animus or purpose,” courts should 
recognize that “discriminations of an unusual character especially 
suggest careful consideration to determine whether they are 
obnoxious to the constitutional provision.”89 In Windsor, the 
Court emphasized that “unusual deviations” provided strong 
evidence that the law had an improper purpose.90 As the Court 
noted, “DOMA’s principal effect is to identify a subset of state-
sanctioned marriages and make them unequal. The principal 
purpose is to impose inequality, not for other reasons like 
governmental efficiency.”91 In that case, the purpose was to 
impose a “disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma upon 
all who enter into same-sex marriages made lawful by the 
unquestioned authority of the States.”92 
In contrast, in Planned Parenthood of Greater Texas Surgical 
Health Services v. Abbott,93 a panel of the Fifth Circuit reversed 
the trial court’s grant of a preliminary injunction and accepted 
the State’s evidence that an admitting privileges requirement 
“would assist in preventing patient abandonment by the 
physician who performed the abortion and then left the patient to 
                                                                                                     
concerned about maternal health. See id.at 791 (expressing doubt about whether 
the statute is “aimed only at protecting the mother’s health”).  
 86. See Planned Parenthood of Heartland v. Heineman, 724 F. Supp. 2d 
1025, 1044 (D. Neb. 2010). 
 87. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).  
 88. Id. at 2695–96.  
 89. Id. at 2692 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 90. Id. at 2693. 
 91. Id. at 2694. 
 92. Id. at 2693. 
 93. 734 F.3d 406 (5th Cir. 2013). 
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her own devices to obtain care if complications developed.”94 The 
court claimed that “[t]he district court’s finding to the contrary is 
not supported by the evidence, and in any event, ‘a legislative 
choice is not subject to courtroom factfinding and may be based 
on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical 
data.’”95 This bold adherence to legislative deference is supported 
by a quote from FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc.,96 with no 
further explanation.97 The court also made the even more 
outrageous and unsupported suggestion that the only way to find 
improper purpose in a facial challenge would be if a purpose to 
place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an 
abortion was “facially indicated” in the statute’s text.98 This 
radical deference, “rational speculation” review, in which the 
court accepted the State’s asserted state interest in women’s 
health as the purpose of the statute without further inquiry,99 is 
lower even than a traditional rational basis test and certainly 
fails to uphold the balance that Casey struck.100 
IV. Review of Legislation’s Service of Claimed State Interest as 
Purpose Inquiry Outside Abortion Jurisprudence 
The difficulty currently facing courts reviewing the validity 
of the state’s purpose in enacting an abortion regulation is that 
the state can always claim that it intends to promote women’s 
health or fetal life to justify a given restriction.101 Indeed, the 
                                                                                                     
 94. Id. at 411. 
 95. Id. 
 96. 508 U.S. 307 (1993). 
 97. Abbott, 734 F.3d at 411. 
 98. Id. at 413–14. 
 99. See id. at 411–12 (discussing the court’s reliance on maternal health 
and adequate medical care to determine that the statute had a rational basis). 
 100. See, e.g., Buchanan, supra note 49, at 1291 (noting some courts have 
imported the “undue burden” standard to “adjudicate the equal protection rights 
of pregnant women in cases that have nothing to do with any countervailing 
state interest in protecting fetal life”); Janet Gallagher, Prenatal Invasion & 
Interventions: What’s Wrong with Fetal Rights, 10 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 9, 15 
(1987) (noting that use of women’s health to limit a woman’s right to choose 
certain medical care is a “serious distortion” of Roe). 
 101. Infra notes 102–04.  
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ease of hiding illicit motive is great in contentious fields like 
abortion where one can always find one expert willing to testify to 
scientifically refuted facts, like that abortion causes breast 
cancer,102 that abortion causes severe depression,103 or that a 
fetus at twenty weeks feels pain.104 If the purpose prong—and 
indeed the Casey plurality’s rejection of Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 
proposal in dissent to apply rational basis scrutiny to abortion 
regulations105—is to mean anything, it must require more than 
                                                                                                     
 102. See Steven Ertelt, Abortion has Caused 300K Breast Cancer Deaths 
Since Roe, LIFENEWS (Jan. 17, 2011, 4:44 PM), http://www.lifenews. 
com/2011/01/17/abortion-has-caused-300k-breast-cancer-deaths-since-roe/ (last 
visited Feb. 4, 2014) (reporting that “[a] leading breast cancer researcher,” Joel 
Brind, “says that abortion has caused at least 300,000 cases of breast cancer 
causing a woman’s death since the Supreme Court allowed virtually unlimited 
abortion in its 1973 case”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
But see Fact Sheet: Abortion, Miscarriage, and Breast Cancer Risk, NAT’L 
CANCER INST. (last updated Jan. 12, 2010), http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/ 
factsheet/Risk/abortion-miscarriage (last visited Feb. 4, 2014) (reporting that 
“[i]n February 2003, the National Cancer Institute (NCI) convened a workshop 
of over 100 of the world’s leading experts who study pregnancy and breast 
cancer risk. . . . [and] [t]hey concluded that having an abortion or miscarriage 
does not increase a woman’s subsequent risk of developing breast cancer”). 
 103. See, e.g., Steven Ertelt, Abortions Cause Severe Depression for Women, 
New Study Shows, LIFENEWS (Jan. 2, 2006, 9:00 AM), 
http://www.lifenews.com/2006/01/02/nat-1941/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2014) 
(reporting that a New Zealand study found women who had abortions to be 
more likely to become severely depressed) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). But cf. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 183 n.7 (2007) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (listing studies in support of the proposition that the 
weight of scientific evidence does not comport “with the idea that having an 
abortion is any more dangerous to a woman’s long-term mental health than 
delivering and parenting a child that she did not intend to have”); AM. 
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, REPORT OF THE APA TASK FORCE ON MENTAL HEALTH AND 
ABORTION 6 (2008), http://www.apa.org/pi/women/programs/abortion/mental-
health.pdf (noting that evidence indicates that the relative risk of mental health 
problems due to an abortion is similar to the risk associated with an unplanned 
pregnancy but that risk increases in certain circumstances). 
 104. See Teresa Stanton Collett, Previability Abortion and the Pain of the 
Unborn, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1211, 1219–24 (2014) (exploring arguments 
supporting the existence of fetal pain). But cf. Susan J. Lee, Fetal Pain: A 
Systematic Multidisciplinary Review of Evidence, 294 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 947, 
947–54 (2005) (reviewing studies and finding that “[e]vidence regarding the 
capacity for fetal pain is limited but indicates that fetal perception of pain is 
unlikely before the third trimester” and “probably does not exist before twenty-
nine or thirty weeks”). 
 105. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992) 
(adopting the undue burden standard despite Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 
argument in dissent); id. at 966 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in 
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bald speculation by the state that a regulation serves an interest 
in potential life or an interest in maternal health. To ensure that 
Casey’s standard is met, that the law in fact serves a valid 
purpose of sufficient importance to warrant any burden it creates, 
courts must look behind these claims to examine the factual 
support for the state’s claim and evidence undermining that 
claim, as the Seventh Circuit did.  
Criticisms and skepticism about the promise of a purpose 
inquiry arise mostly because of the difficulties faced by courts in 
uncovering hidden purposes, especially where doing so requires 
the court to ascertain subjective legislative intent.106 Paul Brest 
called the problem of determining legislative purpose one of the 
“most muddled areas of our constitutional jurisprudence,”107 and 
the Court has warned that “[i]nquiries into congressional motives 
or purposes are a hazardous matter.”108 
However, the concerns about and criticisms of purpose 
inquiries are most applicable in cases where courts are asked to 
“void a statute that is . . . constitutional on its face, on the basis of 
what fewer than a handful of Congressmen said about it.”109 For 
example, a law creating certain zoning restrictions that are 
otherwise permissible may be invalidated if the plaintiffs 
challenging that law can establish that it was enacted with 
racially discriminatory motives. The equal protection violation 
that the court must root out is the racially discriminatory motive 
itself, and the existence of a valid purpose does not necessarily 
negate an invalid one.110 
The same is true in the bill of attainder cases where the 
purpose being examined is itself the unconstitutional act.111 In 
                                                                                                     
part and dissenting in part) (arguing in dissent that “the Constitution does not 
subject state abortion regulations to heightened scrutiny”). 
 106. See Brest, supra note 44, at 99–102 (discussing the difficulty of 
determining legislative motive). 
 107. Id. at 99. 
 108. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968). 
 109. Id. at 384. 
 110. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 
265–66 (1977) (noting that “[w]hen there is a proof that discriminatory purpose 
has been a motivating factor in the decision, . . . judicial deference [to a 
legislature’s decision-making] is no longer justified”). 
 111. See O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 383 n.30 (discussing the need to determine 
legislative purpose in evaluating a bill of attainder). 
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these cases, it is more difficult to determine whether a hidden 
motive exists based on statements of individual legislators that 
might provide some context for race discrimination or bill of 
attainder claims but may not reflect an entire legislative body’s 
purpose.112 As the Court has said of such a context, “[w]hat 
motivates one legislator to make a speech about a statute is not 
necessarily what motivates scores of others to enact it.”113 These 
are difficult determinations, and yet the courts still undertake 
them.  
The inquiries discussed, especially first function purpose 
inquiries, are much simpler. There are numerous other contexts 
in which courts examine the evidence to determine whether a 
statute actually serves a valid interest. Those most analogous to 
the abortion cases are equal right to liberty cases, eminent 
domain cases, and preemption cases. 
A. Equal Right to Liberty—United States v. Windsor  
The Court’s recent decision striking down the federal  
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) has followed Casey’s lead and 
further anchored purpose analysis to judicial review of 
government infringements on the right to liberty, especially when 
groups of people acting in constitutionally protected ways are 
targeted for infringement of their liberty.114 This is because “[t]he 
liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause 
contains within it the prohibition against denying to any person 
the equal protection of the laws.”115 After a careful examination of 
                                                                                                     
 112. See id. at 384 (explaining the need to “eschew guesswork” in such 
situations). 
 113. Id. 
 114. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2689 (2013) (“Against 
this background of lawful same-sex marriage in some States, the design, 
purpose, and effect of DOMA should be considered as the beginning point in 
deciding whether it is valid under the Constitution.”). 
 115. Id. at 2695. For a discussion of rights acting in concert, sometimes 
referred to as “hybrid rights,” see Reva B. Siegel, Abortion as a Sex Equality 
Right: Its Basis in Feminist Theory, in MOTHERS IN LAW: FEMINIST THEORY AND 
THE LEGAL REGULATION OF MOTHERHOOD 43, 68 (Martha Albertson Fineman & 
Isabel Karpin eds., 1995) [hereinafter Siegel, Abortion as a Sex Equality Right] 
(“As Casey illustrates, the Court will oppose abortion restrictions when it 
believes they are gender biased in impetus or impact, even if the Court is not 
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the claimed state interests supporting DOMA, and with an 
interesting mirroring of Casey’s purpose and effect phraseology, 
the Court found that “no legitimate purpose overcomes the 
purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those whom the 
State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and 
dignity.”116 As a result, the Court held, DOMA was an 
unconstitutional deprivation of liberty of the person because the 
“principal purpose and the necessary effect of this law are to 
demean those persons” treated unequally by the law.117 Like the 
men and women who marry their same-sex partners under state 
law and seek the same benefits of marriage available to those 
who marry members of the opposite sex, women who seek 
abortions similarly invoke an equal right to liberty. As the Court 
wrote in Thornburgh, this liberty right “extends to women as well 
as men.”118 
B. Eminent Domain Cases 
Courts also examine “purpose” in the context of takings 
under eminent domain powers. In that context, “a State may 
transfer property from one private party to another if future ‘use 
by the public’ is the purpose of the taking; the condemnation of 
land for a railroad with common-carrier duties is a familiar 
example.”119 The government may not take property “under the 
                                                                                                     
ready to adopt the equal protection clause as the constitutional basis for 
protecting the abortion right.”); Pamela S. Karlan, Equal Protection, Due 
Process, and the Stereoscopic Fourteenth Amendment, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 473, 
473–92 (2002) [hereinafter Karlan, Equal Protection] (describing use of hybrid 
claims combing liberty and equity principles); Pamela S. Karlan, Foreword: 
Loving Lawrence, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1447, 1449–63 (2004) [hereinafter Karlan, 
Foreword] (arguing that the Lawrence decision, while based in liberty 
jurisprudence, incorporates equality principles). 
 116. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696. 
 117. Id. at 2695. 
 118. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 
747, 772 (1986) (noting that failure to protect the woman’s choice to have an 
abortion would “protect inadequately a central part of the sphere of liberty that 
our law guarantees equally to all”); see also Smith, Give Justice Ginsburg, supra 
note 48, at 383–87, 400–02 (providing a brief history of the recognition of 
equality concerns in reproductive rights doctrine and scholarship). 
 119. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477 (2005). 
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mere pretext of a public purpose, when its actual purpose was to 
bestow a private benefit.”120 The disposition of these cases, 
therefore, “turns on the question whether the City’s development 
plan serves a ‘public purpose.’”121 Even in applying “meaningful” 
rational basis review under the Public Use Clause, Justice 
Kennedy has emphasized that a detailed review of legislative 
motivation is required to ascertain whether an illegitimate 
purpose is animating state takings using eminent domain 
power.122 In determining the line between public and private use, 
courts cannot rely blindly on a state’s claimed purpose for the 
taking.123 Justice Kennedy acknowledged that “[a]n external, 
judicial check on how the public use requirement is interpreted, 
however limited, is necessary if this constraint on government 
power is to retain any meaning.”124 Justice Kennedy admonished: 
A court applying rational-basis review under the Public Use 
Clause should strike down a taking that, by a clear showing, is 
intended to favor a particular private party, with only 
incidental or pretextual public benefits, just as a court 
applying rational-basis review under the Equal Protection 
Clause must strike down a government classification that is 
clearly intended to injure a particular class of private parties, 
with only incidental or pretextual public justifications.125 
Courts must take “plausible accusation[s]” of improper 
purpose seriously and “review the record to see if it has merit.”126 
Kennedy approved the trial court’s “careful and extensive inquiry 
into ‘whether, in fact, the development plan is of primary benefit 
to . . . the developer . . . , and in that regard, only of incidental 
                                                                                                     
 120. Id. at 478. 
 121. Id. at 480. 
 122. See id. at 491–92 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that the trial court 
reviewed evidence from six different sources before concluding that benefitting a 
private company was not “the primary motivation or effect of this development 
plan” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 123. See id. at 497 (noting that while the Court gives “considerable 
deference to legislatures’ determinations about what governmental activities 
will advantage the public,” the political branches cannot be the “sole arbiters of 
the public-private distinction” or else the “Public Use Clause would amount to 
little more than hortatory fluff”). 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 491. 
 126. Id. 
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benefit to the city.’”127 It was this extensive and close analysis, 
what Kennedy referred to as meaningful rational basis review, 
that Kennedy noted was, in his view, “required under the Public 
Use Clause.”128 
C. Preemption Cases 
Similarly, in the preemption cases, courts frequently conduct 
detailed evaluations of legislative purpose by combining 
evaluation of whether legislation serves its intended purpose with 
inquiries into subjective legislative intent. The doctrinal question 
in preemption cases, whether certain state action is preempted by 
federal law is one of congressional intent: “‘The purpose of 
Congress is the ultimate touchstone.’”129 Moreover, “the Court 
define[s] the preempted field, in part, by reference to the 
motivation behind the state law.”130 In the absence of explicit 
statutory language establishing the intent to preempt a field, 
congressional purpose to preempt state law by occupying a field 
with its own regulations can be shown by an actual conflict 
between state and federal law, which requires careful analysis of 
the scope and impact of the areas of law.131 The Court has noted 
that it does not “hesitate[] to draw an inference of field pre-
emption where it is supported by the federal statutory and 
regulatory schemes.”132 In fact, purpose can be inferred “from a 
‘scheme of federal regulation . . . so pervasive as to make 
                                                                                                     
 127. Id. (emphasis added) (first omission in original). 
 128. Id.; cf. Andrew Tutt, Blightened Scrutiny, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 1), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2323267 (arguing that heightened scrutiny should be 
required for eminent domain takings under the Constitution) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 129. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 137–38 (1990) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 130. English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 84 (1990). 
 131. See Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992) 
(“Absent explicit pre-emptive language, we have recognized at least two types of 
implied pre-emption: field pre-emption, where the scheme of federal regulation 
is ‘so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room 
for the States to supplement it,’ and conflict pre-emption . . . .”(citations 
omitted)). 
 132. English, 496 U.S. at 79.  
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reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States 
to supplement it,’ or where an Act of Congress ‘touch[es] a field in 
which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system 
will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the 
same subject.’”133 For example, in Pacific Gas and Electric Co. v. 
State Energy Resources Conservation and Development 
Commission,134 “the Court carefully analyzed the congressional 
enactments relating to the nuclear industry in order to decide 
whether a California law that conditioned the construction of a 
nuclear power plant on a state agency’s approval of the plant’s 
nuclear-waste storage and disposal facilities fell within a pre-
empted field.”135 
Courts in these cases often look to legislative history in their 
evaluations of purpose. As the Second Circuit noted recently, 
while the Supreme Court’s opinion in Pacific Gas did not “explain 
with precision the role legislative history plays in the analysis of 
an Atomic Energy Act preemption claims,”136 “legislative history 
is an important source for determining whether a particular 
statute was motivated by an impermissible motive in the 
preemption context.”137 Even after finding that the Supreme 
Court had not explicitly delineated the level of scrutiny a court 
must perform to determine whether a statute is preempted, the 
Second Circuit held that the “Court’s admonition against a ‘state 
judgment that nuclear power is not safe enough to be further 
developed,’ requires us to conduct a more searching review to 
determine whether a statute was enacted based upon radiological 
safety concerns.”138 The court, therefore, “decline[d] Vermont’s 
invitation to apply an analytic framework akin to ‘rational basis 
review,’ which would preclude us from identifying the true 
purpose of a statute as required by Pacific Gas and would allow 
states to implement a ‘moratorium on nuclear construction 
                                                                                                     
 133. Id. 
 134. 461 U.S. 190 (1983). 
 135. English, 496 U.S. at 80 (discussing Pacific Gas). 
 136. Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin, 733 F.3d 393, 419 n.27 
(2d Cir. 2013). 
 137. Id. at 419. 
 138. Id. (citation omitted). 
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grounded in safety concerns [that] falls squarely within the 
prohibited field.’”139 
Similarly, in Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC v. 
Shumlin,140 the Second Circuit examined the purpose of the state 
statute at issue, starting with the text of the statute itself.141 The 
court refused to simply adopt the state interests advanced 
blindly,142 but instead questioned whether the state’s claimed 
goal of diversifying energy sources was really a purpose of the 
statute given the many other ways available to the state to 
achieve this same goal.143 
The court explicitly rejected rational basis review of a state’s 
interest because that would “preclude [it] from identifying the 
true purpose of a statute as required by” Supreme Court 
precedent144:  
We do not blindly accept the articulated purpose of [a state 
statute] for preemption purposes. If that were the rule, 
legislatures could “nullify nearly all unwanted federal 
legislation by simply publishing a legislative committee report 
articulating some state interest or policy—other than 
                                                                                                     
 139. Id. at 416 (citing Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. 
Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 213 (1983)); see also id. at 419 (“We 
can no longer adhere to the aberrational doctrine . . . that state law may 
frustrate the operation of federal law as long as the state legislature in passing 
its law had some purpose in mind other than one of frustration [of the federal 
regulatory scheme].” (quoting Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 
88, 105–06 (1992))). 
 140. 733 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 141. Id. at 414. (“The proper place to begin the analysis of a statute is its 
text.” (citing United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940) 
(“There is, of course, no more persuasive evidence of the purpose of a statute 
than the words by which the legislature undertook to give expression to its 
wishes.”))).  
 142. See id. at 416 (“Although Vermont’s asserted policy interests would not 
necessarily interfere with the preempted concern of radiological safety, our 
inquiry does not end at the text of the statute.”). Specifically, the court noted 
that “[t]he legislative policy and purpose section of Act 160 sets forth several 
rationales for the statute.” Id. at 415. Drawing on the language of the Act, the 
State argued “that Act 160 advances two policy interests: (1) increased use of a 
diverse array of renewable power sources; and (2) promotion of energy sources 
that are more cost-effective.” Id. at 416. 
 143. See id. at 417 (“Closing Vermont Yankee would thus have little effect 
on the actual array of energy sources from which Vermont utilities can purchase 
power.”). 
 144. Id. at 416. 
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frustration of the federal objective—that would be tangentially 
furthered by the proposed state law.”145 
The court then looked to the statute’s legislative history “to 
determine if it was passed with an impermissible motive,” 
rejecting that state’s argument that precedent foreclosed the use 
of legislative history to analyze a state statute’s purpose in 
determining preemption.146 In conducting its close evaluation of 
legislative purpose, the Second Circuit noted that “several other 
courts applying Pacific Gas have endorsed the use of legislative 
history” to examine preemption issues, determining that 
legislative history of both federal as well as state statutes “is an 
important source for determining whether a particular statute 
was motivated by an impermissible motive in the preemption 
context.”147 
Although the lack of systemized record-keeping may make 
[their] task more challenging, the informality of the 
proceedings of the Vermont Legislature and the State’s 
decision to not document its legislative history do not 
immunize Act 160 from judicial inquiry into legislative 
motivation.148 
The Second Circuit approved the district court’s careful 
analysis of legislative purpose, which delved extensively into the 
legislative record, concluding that the record contained 
“references, almost too numerous to count, [that] reveal 
legislators’ radiological safety motivations and reflect their wish 
to empower the legislature to address their constituents’ fear of 
radiological risk, and [the legislators’] beliefs that the plant was 
too unsafe to operate, in deciding a petition for continued 
operation.”149 In affirming the lower court, the Second Circuit 
declared:  
We need not repeat the entirety of the district court’s 
examination, which included considering many hours of 
                                                                                                     
 145. Id. (citing Greater N.Y. Metro. Food Council v. Giuliani, 195 F.3d 100, 
108 (2d Cir. 1999)). 
 146. Id. at 418. 
 147. Id. at 419. 
 148. Id. at 420. 
 149. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC v. 
Shumlin, 838 F. Supp. 2d 183, 229 (D. Vt. 2012)). 
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audiotapes of floor debates and committee meetings for which 
written transcriptions are not typically maintained, except to 
note the remarkable consistency with which both state 
legislators and regulators expressed concern about radiological 
safety and expressed a desire to evade federal preemption.150 
V. The Future of First Function and Second Function Inquiries 
Under the Purpose Prong 
The danger that arises in the abortion context is different 
from the danger that arises in the context of a law neutral on its 
face but enacted with discriminatory motive. We are not 
confronted with neutral laws of general applicability that may 
impact a certain racial or religious group disproportionately. We 
are most often confronted with laws that squarely subject 
abortion services, and thus women who seek them, to unique 
burdens.151 This may not always be true. There may come a time 
when abortion is not regulated differently from other medical 
procedures. But even if a generally applicable regulation has 
some sort of differential impact on abortion and creates a 
substantial obstacle to obtaining one, it would need to be 
challenged.152 This is simply not the case now. All contemporary 
regulations of abortion being challenged regulate abortion 
differently than other similar medical procedures, claiming to 
serve a valid purpose nonetheless.153 
                                                                                                     
 150. Id. 
 151. See Buchanan, supra note 49, at 1239 (explaining that “[s]exual 
regulation has always been gendered. . . . [I]t visits the legal, financial, health, 
and reproductive burdens of unmarried sex exclusively on women”). 
 152. The author has failed in her attempt to come up with an example of 
such a regulation. But perhaps her imagination has simply failed her. 
 153. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. 
Abbott, 734 F.3d 406, 409 (5th Cir. 2013) (describing the two provisions at issue: 
one “requires that a physician performing or inducing an abortion have 
admitting privileges, on the date of the procedure, at a hospital no more than 
thirty miles from the location” of the procedure; the other limits the use of 
abortion-inducing drugs, but no other drugs, to the label approved for 
advertising with certain narrow exceptions); Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. 
Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 786, 787 (7th Cir. 2013)  
describing the statute at issue as one that “prohibits a doctor, 
under threat of heavy penalties if he defies the prohibition, from 
performing an abortion (and in Wisconsin only doctors are allowed 
to perform abortions) unless he has admitting privileges at a 
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In abortion cases, the first function purpose inquiry to 
determine whether the state’s interest in potential life or in 
women’s health is in fact served by the legislation at issue 
requires close examination of medical and scientific evidence. If 
the statute does in fact serve a valid state interest, the court must 
also conduct a second inquiry to determine that there was not 
also some hidden motive, such as the purpose of promoting an 
outmoded view of the dominion of husband over wife at issue in 
Casey.154  
In making the case for judicial invalidation of illicitly 
motivated laws even where those laws also served a valid 
purpose, Paul Brest made an argument I find particularly 
persuasive that stems from concerns about the legitimacy and 
integrity of government policy-making processes, legislative or 
administrative. Brest argued that consideration of illicit 
objectives can influence the outcome of the decision making 
process, encouraging more restrictive regulation than the 
lawfully motivated decision maker would enact.155 In other words, 
illicit motives could prejudice the decision maker, undermining 
his or her objectivity and ability to appropriately weigh evidence 
in favor of the regulation. He argued that this lack of objectivity 
should undercut the deference we commonly give to legislative 
decision making as well as our faith in the democratic legitimacy 
of the legislative process.156 
If we were conducting an equal protection review of an 
abortion regulation, an illicit purpose, such as a purpose to 
promote an outmoded stereotype of women, definitely would be 
enough to invalidate the regulation for the reasons Brest 
                                                                                                     
hospital no more than 30 miles from the clinic in which the 
abortion is performed,” but fails to impose similar requirements on 
physicians performing any other procedures  
(citation omitted); Cline v. Okla. Coal. for Reprod. Justice, 313 P.3d 253, 
262 (Okla. 2013) (answering the Court’s certified questions by explaining 
that statute requiring doctors to use outdated medical protocol 
“effectively bans all medication abortions”). 
 154. Supra Part II.B. 
 155. See Brest, supra note 44, at 116 (describing how illicit motivation can 
influence the decision maker’s ability to make objective decisions). 
 156. See id. at 116–18 (“In this case, proof that the decision maker took 
account of an illicit objective rebuts whatever presumption of regularity 
otherwise attaches.”). 
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outlines, and the sex discrimination case law upholds. Under the 
undue burden standard, however, the question is arguably more 
difficult to answer. One could argue that the right to abortion 
may be regulated so long as it does not have the effect of imposing 
an undue burden and so long as it serves a valid purpose, even if 
it also was enacted with an invalid one.157 
On the other hand, based on what the Court actually did in 
Casey, it seems eminently reasonable to argue that when illicit 
objectives are part of the decision making process in enacting an 
abortion regulation, even one that is found to in fact serve a valid 
state interest, the court should also inquire into the existence of 
an invalid purpose and strike the statute if an invalid purpose 
exists.158 This would mean that even if the court found a 
regulation actually served an interest in maternal health, the 
regulation would still fall if it was enacted with the purpose of 
reinforcing traditional sex-role stereotypes. In fact, this seems to 
be exactly what the Court did in striking the spousal notification 
provision.159 Surely, informing one’s husband, even a husband 
vehemently opposed to a woman’s abortion, would result in a 
more “informed” decision, or at least allow the state to express its 
preference for childbirth over abortion through a husband who 
shared this view. Nonetheless, the Court struck the provision at 
least in part because it expressed an outmoded view of women’s 
proper role in society.160 
                                                                                                     
 157. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992) 
(“[M]easures to ensure that the woman’s choice is informed, and measures 
designed to advance this interest will not be invalidated as long as their purpose 
is to persuade the woman to choose childbirth over abortion.” (emphasis added)). 
 158. See Brest, supra note 44, at 118 (arguing that when a decision is 
partially based on illicit objectives “the court should place on the decision-maker 
a heavy burden of proving that his illicit objective was not determinative of the 
outcome”). 
 159. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 887–98 (invalidating Pennsylvania’s spousal 
notification requirement because it was an undue burden on a woman’s choice to 
undergo an abortion). 
 160. See id. at 898 (“Section 3209 embodies a view of marriage consonant 
with the common-law status of married women but repugnant to our present 
understanding of marriage and of the nature of the rights secured by the 
Constitution. Women do not lose their constitutionally protected liberty when 
they marry.”). Paul Brest rebutted arguments that invalidating laws with 
improper purposes when they also served valid purposes, laws with mixed 
motivations, was both futile and inefficient because they could be reenacted 
without the improper purposes. Brest, supra note 44, at 119–28. Indeed, if we 
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Given the current state of abortion jurisprudence, it would be 
a significant step towards implementation of the Casey purpose 
prong if courts would always undertake an exacting first function 
inquiry to ensure that the legislation in fact serves a valid state 
interest.161 This more limited application of the Casey purpose 
prong, requiring an exacting inquiry into whether the regulation 
serves the state’s valid interests in potential life or maternal 
health to determine whether it had a valid purpose, has one 
practical advantage over purpose inquiries in the equal protection 
context. It requires only a fairly common, if not mundane, judicial 
function of closely examining the fit between the claimed state 
interest and the regulation itself to confirm that the regulation 
actually serves the valid interest.162  
                                                                                                     
take seriously the idea that the bad motive has tainted the decision making 
process, then invalidating the law will improve the quality of decision making in 
our democracy by ridding the process of any improper weighing of the pros and 
cons of regulation. Id. at 127–28. If the same regulation is reenacted based on 
proper motive and supports valid state interests, so be it. Id. at 125 (“Judicial 
review of motivation is no more ‘futile’ merely because reenactment is possible 
than appellate review is futile because an appellee may prevail again on remand 
after a trial court is reversed for giving weight to inadmissible evidence or 
misapplying the law.”). Second, Brest notes that intolerance for illicit purpose is 
proper because the bad purpose is harmful in and of itself, and doing away with 
bad purpose is thus a good. Id. at 127. This characterization rebuts both a claim 
of futility and inefficiency or “disutility,” the idea that judicial review of illicit 
motivation may result in invalidation of law that is otherwise perfectly good, 
even where the law can be reenacted based either on an actual good purpose or 
on a sham good purpose. Id. at 125–28. If the law can simply be reenacted based 
on a claimed good purpose, then the only “harm” in striking down a so-called 
“good law” because it was enacted for a bad purpose, is that it can be reenacted 
again and the legislature has had to stand on valid principle the second time in 
enacting the good law. Id. at 125. This is no harm at all but another assurance 
that the democratic process is working as it should. Id. at 127. 
 161. Compare Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 786, 
795–99 (7th Cir. 2013) (affirming a preliminary injunction against the 
enforcement of a statute requiring admitting privileges, in part, because there 
was no evidence that the statute served an interest in women’s health), with 
Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs., v. Abbott, 734 F.3d 
406, 419 (5th Cir. 2013) (ordering a stay on a permanent injunction against the 
enforcement of Texas’s admitting privileges requirement statute based on the 
state’s bald allegation that it served maternal health), motion to vacate denied 
by 134 S. Ct. 506 (2013). 
 162. Cf. Brest, supra note 44, at 119–28 (discussing critiques of judicial 
inquiry into motive because of the difficulty in ascertaining motivation). 
1170 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1135 (2014) 
VI. Conclusion 
We are at a critical juncture in the abortion debate. The 
courts, and the Supreme Court of the United States in particular, 
may respond to these regulations with the full force of Casey’s 
original power and arrest the erosion of access and reduction in 
services that has taken a real toll on women’s lives.163 If they do 
not, renewed pro-choice activism and mobilization of women and 
men on the abortion issue threaten (or promise, depending on 
one’s point of view) over time to unravel the increasingly uneasy 
alliance the Republican Party has made with anti-choice 
activists,164 or at least make the party increasingly irrelevant to 
half the nation.165 In the meantime, even if the Court does not 
                                                                                                     
 163. See Laura Bassett, Anti-Abortion Laws Take Dramatic Toll on Clinics 
Nationwide, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 11, 2013, 4:12 PM), http://www. 
huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/26/abortion-clinic-closures_n_3804529.html (last 
visited Jan. 29, 2014) (conducting a nationwide survey concluding that fifty-four 
abortion providers across twenty-seven states have ended their abortion services 
since the legislative attacks on providers began in 2010) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); Laura Tillman & John Schwartz, Texas 
Clinics Stop Abortions After Court Ruling, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/02/us/texas-abortion-clinics-say-courts-ruling-
is-forcing-them-to-stop-the-procedures.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2014) (noting 
that after an appeals court reversed a grant of preliminary injunction, many 
clinics across the state stopped providing abortions, leaving women seeking 
services struggling to find services out of state or in Mexico) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 164. See Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Before (And After) Roe v. 
Wade: New Questions About Backlash, 120 YALE L.J. 2028, 2052–67 (2011) 
(discussing Republican Party efforts to attract Catholic anti-abortion voters to 
the party); id. at 2067–71 (discussing gradual realignment of Republican and 
Democratic Parties on the issue of abortion). 
 165. See Jeremy W. Peters, Parties Seize on Abortion Issues in Midterm 
Race, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/21/us/politics/ 
parties-seize-on-abortion-issues-in-midterm-race.html (last visited Jan. 29, 
2014) (noting that both parties seek to use the abortion issue to their advantage 
and discussing Republican concern about improper “framing” of the issue that 
could repel women voters) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
While some Republicans “summit” to discuss how to avoid alienating women 
voters, former Republican Governor of Arkansas and presidential candidate 
Mike Huckabee bizarrely lambasted Democratic support of insurance coverage 
for contraceptives as a sign that Democrats think women need government help 
to control their libidos: 
[I]f the Democrats want to insult the women of America by making 
them believe that they are helpless without Uncle Sugar coming in 
and providing [] them a prescription each month for birth control 
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directly overrule Roe v. Wade, without a renewed commitment to 
Casey, access to abortion care will continue to diminish at this 
pace, and we find ourselves once again facing an intolerable 
situation like that Justice Blackmun warned of in his 1991 
dissent in Rust v. Sullivan: 
While technically leaving intact the fundamental right 
protected by Roe v. Wade, the Court “through a relentlessly 
formalistic catechism,” once again has rendered the right’s 
substance nugatory. This is a course nearly as noxious as 
overruling Roe directly, for if a right is found to be 
unenforceable, even against flagrant attempts by government 
to circumvent it, then it ceases to be a right at all.166 
  
                                                                                                     
because they cannot control their libido or their reproductive system 
without the help of government, then so be it, let’s take that 
discussion all across America. 
Alexandra Petri, Mike Huckabee and Women’s Uncontrolled Libido, or, Uncle 
Sugar, WASH. POST (Jan. 23, 2014, 4:15 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
blogs/compost/wp/2014/01/23/mike-huckabee-and-womens-uncontrolled-libido-or 
-uncle-sugar/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 166. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 220 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
(citations omitted) (quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 341 (1980) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting)). 
